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Background: Traditionally, healthcare’s culture has held individuals accountable for all errors or mishaps that 
befall patients under their care. This punitive approach creates the culture of fear among practitioners that with- 
held information that is needed to identify faulty systems and create safer ones. As an alternative to this tradi- 
tional system, application of a model which is widely used in aviation industry known as the Just Culture Model 
seeks to create an environment that encourages individuals to report mistakes so that the precursors to errors 
can be better understood in order to fix the system issues (ANA, 2010). 
Methods: This concept analysis that utilized the Walker and Avant method aims to (a) observe the basic ele- 
ments of the concept under study i.e., defining attributes, antecedents, consequences and empirical referents; (b) 
develop an operational definition that is meaningful across different discipline and participants that can be easily 
understood and useful across research, policy and practice; and (c) highlight implications for research of the fu- 
ture. Defining Attributes: According to this analysis, the occurrence of a just culture environment involves three 
main features which include (a) encouragement of error disclosure through open communication; (b) a well- 
established balanced accountability; and (c) a collaborative learning environment. These attributes reinforces the 
implicit claim of just culture that it is inevitable for practitioners to commit mistakes that even the most experi- 
enced individual is capable of making mistakes. It is also implied in just culture that punishment is not an assur- 
ance that workers will not be making mistakes and that perfecting a performance is impossible and can never be 
sustained. 
Conclusion: Based on the attributes extracted by this concept analysis, just culture is hereby operationally de- 
fined as an environment that reflects a well-established balance accountability supporting collaborative learning 
that stems from the encouragement of error-disclosure attained through open communication. Having the con- 
cept operationally defined and despite the recognized importance of a just culture, not every healthcare institu- 
tion has adopted this type of approach. 
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Background and Significance 
 
Nursing has always been viewed as a complex 
discipline where multiple philosophies merge into one to 
understand its multi-factorial milieu. However, it is note 
-worthy that most errors take place within complex sys- 
tems .This environmental complexity of nursing then 
makes it inevitable for nurses to commit errors that may 
be intentional or unintentional in nature. Nurses, like 
any other humans, are vulnerable to fallibility that re- 
sults to either positive or negative outcomes. When er- 
rors occur, however, the immediate solution is to blame 
an individual for the error. Blaming individuals creates a 
culture of fear, discourages open reporting and discus- 
sion of errors, and does little to prevent future errors or 
improve the safety of the health care system (NCBON, 
2011). 
 
Traditionally, healthcare’s culture has held 
individuals accountable for all errors or mishaps that 
befall patients under their care. According to Leape 
(2000), as cited by American Nurses Association (2010) 
these approaches that focus on punishing individuals 
instead of changing systems provide strong incentives 
for people to report only those errors they cannot hide. 
Thus, a punitive approach shuts off the information that 
is needed to identify faulty systems and  create safer 
ones. In a punitive system, no one learns from their mis- 
takes. Many observers attribute underreporting to the 
punitive (‘‘name and blame’’) approach that many 
healthcare organizations have taken with regard to safe- 
ty incidents. By inculcating a sense of fear, the punitive 
approach discourages reporting and, in doing so, pre- 
vents organizational learning and improvement (Barach 
& Small, 2000; Blegen et al., 2004; Kadzielski & Mar- 
tin, 2002; Kingston, Evans, Smith, & Berry, 2004; Ma- 
nasse, Eturnbull, & Diamond, 2002; Wakefield et al., 
2001, 1999). As an alternative to this traditional system, 
application of a model which is widely used in aviation 
industry known as the Just Culture Model seeks to cre- 
ate an environment that encourages individuals to report 
mistakes so that the precursors to errors can be better 
understood in order to fix the system issues (ANA, 
2010). 
 
Development of the concept and meaning in pub- 
lished works 
 
In 1997, as mentioned by ANA (2010), John 
Reason wrote that a Just Culture creates an atmosphere 
of trust, encouraging and rewarding people for provid- 
ing essential safety-related information. A Just Culture 
is also explicit about what constitutes acceptable and 
unacceptable behavior. Therefore a Just Culture is the 
middle component between patient safety and a safety 
culture (Reason, 1997). However, the term “Just Cul- 
ture” was first used in a 2001 report by David Marx 
(Marx, 2001), a report which popularized the term in 
the patient safety lexicon (Agency for Healthcare Re- 
search and Quality, n.d.). Further he argues that disci- 
pline needs to be tied to the behavior of individuals and 
the potential risks their behavior presents more than the 
actual outcome of their actions (Marx, 2001). Its model, 
as named by ANA (2010) addresses two questions: 1) 
What is the role of punitive sanction in the safety of our 
health care system and 2) Does the threat and/or appli- 
cation of punitive sanction as a remedy for human error 
help or hurt our system safety efforts? The model 
acknowledges that humans are destined to make mis- 
takes and because of this no system can be designed to 
produce perfect results. Given that premise, human 
error and adverse events should be considered out- 
comes to be measured and monitored with the goal 
being error reduction (rather than error concealment) 
and improved system design (Marx, 2001). 
 
Just Culture, as defined in aviation industry, is 
a culture in which front line operators are not punished 
for actions, omissions or decisions taken by them that 
are commensurate with the experience and training, but 
where gross negligence, wilful violations and destruc- 
tive acts are not tolerated (Eurocontrol, 2014). Reason 
(n.d), as quoted by Skybrary (n.d) claimed that it is an 
atmosphere of trust in which people are encouraged, 
even rewarded for proving essential safety-related in- 
formation but in which they are also clear about where 
the line must be drawn between acceptable and unac- 
ceptable behaviour. 
 
In the health care arena, Medscape (n.d) em- 
phasized that Just Culture recognizes that human error 
and faulty systems can cause a mistake and encourages 
an investigation of what led to the error instead of an 
immediate rush to blame a person. A just culture, ex- 
pert say, is a ‘‘non-punitive’’ environment in which 
individuals can report errors or close calls without fear 
of reprimand, rebuke, or reprisal (Blegen et al., 2004; 
Karadeniz & Cakmakci, 2002; Kingston et al., 2004; 
Pizzi, Goldfarb, & Nash, 2001; Wakefield et al., 1999; 
Wild & Bradley, 2005). Moreover, just culture is not a 
“blame-free” approach. It is a strategy that gets into the 
root of the problem, whether it is a worker wilfully 
contributing to the error or the system providing inade- 
quate support to the worker’s need. Furthermore, it is a 
system of justice that involves both investigatory action 
and disciplinary action. Hence, a “just culture” stands 
between a ‘‘blaming’’ or punitive culture, on the one 
hand, and a ‘‘no-blame’’ or ‘‘anything-goes’’ culture, 
on the other. This view reflects the connotation of bal- 
ance  typically  associated  with  the  terms  ‘‘just’’  or 
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‘‘fair.’ (Weiner, Hobgood & Lewis, 2007). It balances 
the need to learn from mistakes and the need to take 
disciplinary action where appropriate. 
 
Purpose of Analysis 
 
A just culture is seen by some experts as an 
integral aspect of a broader culture of safety (Institute of 
Medicine, 2003; Kizer, 1999). Indeed, Reason (1997) 
considers it the foundation of a culture of safety. Sur- 
prisingly, despite the importance ascribed to it, no con- 
cise definition of just culture exists. This concept analy- 
sis that utilized the Walker and Avant method aims to 
(a) observe the basic elements of the concept under 
study i.e., defining attributes, antecedents, consequences 
and empirical referents; (b) develop an operational defi- 
nition that is meaningful across different discipline and 
participants that can be easily understood and useful 
across research, policy and practice; and (c) highlight 
implications for research of the future. 
 
Definition and defining attributes of just culture 
 
Although the term ‘‘just culture’’ can be con- 
strued broadly, the term is often more narrowly used to 
refer to the beliefs, assumptions, and expectations that 
govern accountability and discipline for unsafe acts 
(e.g., near misses, medical errors, and adverse events) 
(Weiner, Hobgood & Lewis, 2007). To make this ap- 
proach work, it is vital to deduce the underpinnings of 
the concept from eclectic literature. As such, it allows 
one to comprehensively understand the concept thus 
eradicating misconceptions. According to this analysis, 
the occurrence of a just culture environment involves 
three main features which include (a) encouragement of 
error disclosure through open communication; (b) a well 
-established balanced accountability; and (c) a collabo- 
rative learning environment. 
 
In a setting where just culture is implemented, 
encouragement of error disclosure is emphasized 
through open communication. As stated in Skybrary 
(2014) the personnel is clear, that in the interest of safe- 
ty, the organisation wants to know, at all times, about 
unsafe events, unsafe situations that have presented 
themselves or could arise. They are keen to step forward 
and speak up when they perceive a situation as danger- 
ous, think of a procedure as risky, or any other issue in 
their daily tasks that they judge as potentially harmful 
and is yet without good remedy. This specifically in- 
cludes any situation or event that involves them. Just 
culture creates an environment where employees/ 
practitioners are not afraid to disclose any error commit- 
ted. This system makes sure the staffs are motivated to 
report and the trend must be maintained. This is 
achieved through an open dialogue and that individuals 
are not immediately blamed for errors. Moreover, when- 
ever there are reports, the organization assures that they 
are acknowledged, discussed properly and provided with 
appropriate feedbacks. It focuses on the behavioural 
choices of the individual, the degree of risk-taking be- 
havior, and whether the individual deliberately disre- 
garded a substantial risk. It holds the individual account- 
able who makes unsafe or reckless choices that endan- 
ger clients or others. 
 
When errors occur, the person who committed 
the error is not blamed instantly. He or she is not pun- 
ished outright but rather a safety investigation is initiat- 
ed to determine the proper disciplinary action. This 
claim shows that the organisation has well-established 
balance accountability. For in just culture, it looks into 
behavioural choices rather than the error and the out- 
come of the error itself. It is way of safety thinking that 
promotes a questioning attitude, is resistant to compla- 
cency, is committed to excellence; foster both personal 
accountability and corporate self-regulation in safety 
matters (Coloradofirecamp.com, n.d). As denoted in 
Skybrary (2014), when it becomes apparent that staff 
has made an error, the organisation will neither assume 
nor seek personal fault or guilt. There is a strong belief 
that punishment is counterproductive to safety. The or- 
ganisation investigates why this error was made and 
what can be done to avoid them or to mitigate the effects 
for future operations. The workforce is protected as best 
as possible from negative consequences resulting from 
human error or subsequent investigations and in princi- 
ple the organisation will defend and support people 
should external prosecutions or litigations target them. 
The organisation attempts to repair the situation as best 
as possible and restore the operations to normal. The 
organisation provides compensation for those that have 
experienced personal loss or damage. The organisation 
tries hard to prevent that same event from happening 
again. A case is not closed by condemning or finding the 
guilty one, but by discovering the underlying problems 
in the system, by rectifying this and by repairing the 
damages done (Skybrary, 2014). 
 
When the problem is discovered, rectified and 
repaired, the organisation then communicates the situa- 
tion with confidentiality to all the members of the group. 
This dissemination intends not to humiliate somebody 
but rather provides a learning platform for everyone. In 
just culture, the error that has happened was seen not as 
something to be fixed but rather an opportunity of learn- 
ing and ironing the system. It creates an environment of 
introspection while errors are discussed and collectively 
outlines improved policies, protocols and/or guidelines. 
It also shapes a venue for the enrichment of managerial 
competencies. 
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These attributes reinforces the implicit claim 
of just culture that it is inevitable for practitioners to 
commit mistakes that even the most experienced indi- 
vidual is capable of making mistakes. It is also implied 
in just culture that punishment is not an assurance that 
workers will not be making mistakes and that perfecting 
a performance is impossible and can never be sustained. 
 
Model case 
 
To exemplify the concept of just culture, this 
model case is hereby presented using the situation quot- 
ed by Erickson (2012): 
 
Nicol is working with a hospital system in 
Alabama to implement Just Culture and improve medi- 
cation processes, from the time a physician thinks about 
writing an order until the medication is being monitored 
in the patient’s body. Nicol reviewed the hospital’s 
scanning rates for bedside bar coding. Although the 
hospital’s leadership thought nurses were doing a great 
job of scanning, “it turns out that the nurses hardly ever 
truly scanned the arm band on a patient,” she said. “We 
had to look deeper to understand the reasons behind this 
behavioral choice.” It turns out that the nurses weren’t 
scanning the bar codes on the patients’ armbands be- 
cause often the bar codes don’t work. Sometimes this is 
a result of a printer error or the band getting wet or torn. 
“The nurses said, ‘I know I need to confirm and scan the 
bar codes, but the system doesn’t work for me,’” said 
Nicol. Once she identified the barriers  to  complying 
with the bar code scanning process, the hospital began 
working on fixing the underlying problems so the pro- 
cess will work for the nurses. 
 
Upon discovering the problem, it is rectified 
through collaborative process enhancement. The imple- 
mentation of the enhanced process would then be one of 
the agenda on the next hospital personnel meeting espe- 
cially on division of nursing. 
 
Borderline case 
 
The hospital has a new program to coincide 
with the IHI 100,000 lives campaign on reducing surgi- 
cal site infections. In order to guarantee that antibiotics 
are given with in one hour of the incision, the responsi- 
bility for administering antibiotics has been put in the 
hands of the anesthesia provider in the operating room. 
There is one exception – if the patient needs a special 
antibiotic protocol requiring more than one antibiotic, 
the regime is started in the pre surgical unit. 
 
Brian is an experienced pre-op nurse. It is a 
very busy morning. One of his colleagues has called in 
sick. He looks over the schedule of patients for the first 
cases and notices that Mr. Brown is scheduled for a new 
procedure that requires three antibiotics be given before 
surgery. He also knows that one of the antibiotics must 
be given slowly so he begins his care with Mr. Brown. 
After his initial assessment, Brian hangs the first antibi- 
otic, Vancomycin 1 GM and signs the medication ad- 
ministration sheet. He returns in 90 minutes and hangs 
the second antibiotic, Gentamycin 80 mg. The surgical 
resident who is new to the service stops in the preopera- 
tive unit to read the chart of the patient. The resident 
takes the paper record to the conference room. Brian 
returns to the bedside and checks his order on the CPOE 
for the final antibiotic and hangs the Ancef, 1 GM. The 
paper MAR is with the chart so he makes a mental note 
to sign the MAR before the patient goes to the OR. 
 
The antibiotic infusion is finished but Brian 
forgets to go back to the chart since his usual practice is 
to sign the MAR when he hangs the medication. An 
orderly comes to pick up the patient for the OR. Upon 
entering the OR, THE CRNA notices that 2 of the 3 
antibiotics have been administered and proceeds to hang 
Ancef prior to the procedure. The patient receives the 
duplicate dose before the presurgical nurse (Brian) re- 
members he did not sign the MAR and calls into the 
room. The patient had no adverse  outcome  (AORN, 
n.d). 
 
Brian wrote an incident report about what hap- 
pened and verified  the incident with the persons in- 
volved. After hearing all sides, no one was suspended 
but the head hoped it serves a lesson to those involved. 
A new process was devised and is set to be implemented 
next week. However, the head further asked all of them 
to keep what happened within them and not to tell any- 
one. 
 
Related case 
 
American Operating Room Nurses (n.d) pro- 
vided another scenario which will serve as a related case 
for this analysis 
 
Patient C is brought to the PACU following a 
lengthy procedure during which he exhibited periods of 
hypotension. An epidural catheter had been placed dur- 
ing surgery for postoperative pain control. The anesthe- 
sia provider debated about extubating the patient at the 
end of the case but decided the patient was currently 
stable enough to have the tube removed. However, she 
did not want to start the epidural infusion until she was 
sure the patient continued on a stable post op course. 
Routine pain management medications were ordered. 
 
The PACU nurse Karen, is a caring for Patient 
C. She is aware of the plan of care and has assessed than 
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her patient is awake and vital signs have remained sta- 
ble. She is anxious to start the epidural infusion so that 
her patient can remain alert and pain free. She realizes 
she has a small window of opportunity for the anesthesi- 
ologist to see Patient C in-between her OR cases. 
 
In anticipation of the visit from anesthesia, 
Karen removes the epidural infusion from the automated 
medication dispensing machine while she is getting her 
first dose of postoperative antibiotics. 
 
While Karen was preparing to hang the antibi- 
otic, the anesthesiologist arrived at the bedside and be- 
gan to assess the patient. Karen wanted to hang the pig- 
gyback ASAP so she could assist the anesthesiologist as 
necessary. She inadvertently picked up the epidural in- 
fusion instead of the antibiotic and proceeded to hang it. 
As she was completing the task the anesthesiologist 
asked for the epidural infusion. As Karen reached for 
the bag, she saw it was the antibiotic. She immediately 
shut off the epidural infusion and then froze as the error 
sank in. The anesthesiologist again asked for the infu- 
sion and the nurse turned around to see that the patient 
was starting to loose consciousness. The nurse immedi- 
ately told the anesthesiologist she had hung the wrong 
medication. 
 
 
 
The anesthesiologist reversed the patient and 
assisted his breathing for a few minutes. The patient did 
not need to be reintubated but spent a prolonged time in 
the PACU to ensure complete reversal of the medica- 
tion. 
 
Contrary case 
 
There is a recommendation from the ISMP that 
some high risk medications should always have a double 
check before being administered. The Director of Peri- 
operative Services has identified that there have been 
several near misses involving heparin solutions on the 
sterile field and that the operating room staff should 
embrace this recommendation. 
 
Surgical Tech Edward is nearing completion 
of his orientation. The usual staffing pattern calls for 
him to scrub and his preceptor, Faith, who is an RN to 
circulate. 
team leader usually provides the second check of calcu- 
lations for circulating nurses in her assigned area. 
 
Mary calculates the dosages of heparin infu- 
sion for both the irrigation and the flush doses on the 
sterile field. The surgical tech, Edward, accepts  the 
meds and does not question Mary as he is nervous that 
he is alone without his usual preceptor and does not 
want to anger the team leader. Mary documents both his 
initials and those of the absent circulating nurse in the 
perioperative record. 
 
Upon return from lunch, the circulating nurse, 
Faith, reviews the documentation for completeness be- 
fore signing off the record. She notices her initials on 
the medication check and informs the nurse manager 
(AORN, n.d). 
 
The nurse manager immediately reprimanded 
Mary and went immediately to the chief nurse and medi- 
cal director and recommended for Mary’s suspension. 
 
 
 
 
 
Antecedents, consequences and empirical referents 
 
The following antecedents are identified in the 
concept analysis of a just culture: (a) established inci- 
dent reporting system; (b) trust between employer and 
employee; (c) just culture policy communicated 
throughout the organization and (d) root cause analysis. 
These factors are said to be qualifications to foster a just 
culture environment. With the presence of these varia- 
bles, just culture is created and maintained. 
 
By contrast, a just culture situation would re- 
sult to the following consequences: (a) improved organi- 
zation/care delivery system; (b) successful implementa- 
tion of safety regulations; (c) safe environment; (d) pro- 
ducing better outcomes; and (e) quality patient care. 
Moreover, to empirically verify such outcomes, the fol- 
lowing indicators are outlined: (a) increased client satis- 
faction; (b) increased employee job satisfaction; (c) in- 
creased event reports; (d) well-defined job performance 
expectations; and (e) clear guidelines and/or protocols of 
the organization. 
 
Operational definition implication of just culture 
The case is considered “minor”. It is the inser- 
tion of a mediport. There is a shortage of staff to do 
lunch reliefs so the team leader for the pediatric service, 
Mary, assigns herself to circulate on this case. The team 
leader Mary has a history of intimation of new staff and 
a sense that the new rules do not add any value to pa- 
tient safety and only take away from efficiency. The 
 
Based on the attributes extracted by this con- 
cept analysis, just culture is hereby operationally de- 
fined as an environment that reflects a well-established 
balance accountability supporting collaborative learning 
that stems from the encouragement of error-disclosure 
attained through open communication. This definition is 
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supported by Weiner, Hobgood and Lewis (2007) when 
they referred just culture as the beliefs, assumptions, and 
expectations that govern accountability and discipline 
for unsafe acts. 
 
Having the concept operationally defined and 
despite the recognized importance of a just culture, not 
every healthcare institution has adopted this type of 
approach. ANA (2010), in their position paper about this 
concept officially endorse the Just Culture concept as a 
strategy to reduce errors and promote patient safety in 
health care. In their efforts to endorse this “non- 
punitive” approach, they promote and disseminate infor- 
mation about the Just Culture concept in ANA publica- 
tions, through constituent member associations, and 
ANA affiliated organizations. Hence, the feasibility of 
incorporating this approach in the present system must 
be taken into consideration. 
 
However, the adopting organization must de- 
velop its own strategies in implementing just culture. It 
is because no single method fits all in applying the just 
culture. This concept when used as an approach in im- 
proving the quality of care must be contextualized de- 
pending on the acceptance and capability of the institu- 
tion to implement this model. Once this approach is 
incorporated in the system, ANA (2010) encourages 
continued research into the effectiveness of the Just 
Culture concept in improving patient safety and employ- 
ee performance outcomes. 
 
Summary 
 
Just culture is one of the concepts that makes 
up the safety culture construct. Little literature has been 
published that tackles the concept that, as cited by 
Weiner, Hobgood and Lewis (2007), even the safety 
literature offers little guidance on how to create a just 
culture. Still according to them, although the term ‘‘just 
culture’’ can be construed broadly, the term is often 
more narrowly used to refer to the beliefs, assumptions, 
and expectations that govern accountability and disci- 
pline for unsafe acts (e.g., near misses, medical errors, 
and adverse events) .Thus, it supports the notion that it 
is inevitable for humans to commit mistake. And this 
inevitability of human fallibility has led traditionally to 
blaming and punishing humans for the errors commit- 
ted. Only through promoting a culture that supports crit- 
ical analysis, constructive feedback and productive dia- 
logue will we ever be able to learn from errors and im- 
prove safe patient care. In order to move toward a fair 
and “Just Culture”, where learning can occur, we must 
provide a forum where errors or unanticipated outcomes 
can be used as the basis for a learning process, rather 
than grounds for punishment (NCBON, 2011). 
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